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Introduction
It is probably trite to note that legal scholarship has become increasingly 
interdisciplinary, a development that has wrought both promises and perils.1 
In this essay, I expand upon that observation by introducing my own 
contribution to interdisciplinary legal scholarship, which I call population-
based legal analysis.2 By integrating public health’s norms, perspectives, and 
methodologies into legal analysis, I will argue, population-based legal analysis 
can transcend the chasm that lies between legal scholarship about nonlegal 
issues on the one hand, and nonlegal scholarship about law and its eff ects on 
society on the other. 
I begin by mapping that chasm. After discussing what is required to cross 
the divide and achieve a thick form of interdisciplinarity, I describe population-
based legal analysis. I explain how it merges public health into law, and why 
public health’s merger into law is deeper and richer than that of many other 
disciplines. I conclude by highlighting some challenges that remain. 

1. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 950-
52 (1996); Dave Owen & Caroline Noblet, Interdisciplinary Research and Environmental Law, 41 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 892-900 (2014); Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 1314, 1317-20, 1325 (2002); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 1217, 1217-20 (2002).
2.  I developed this concept most fully in WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH & 
THE LAW 51-59 (2009) [hereinafter PARMET, POPULATIONS].
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There is certainly no need to rehash here the myriad reasons for the ascent of 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship. In our postlegal-realist world, it is untenable 
to suggest that the law is wholly autonomous,3 or that legal scholarship about 
social, economic, or scientifi c questions should be uninformed by the expertise 
that relevant nonlegal fi elds may provide. Imagine what scholarship regarding 
climate change would look like without any consideration of climate science! 
Or consider a discussion of the application of patent law to biotechnology that 
was oblivious of human genetics. Clearly any serious scholarship regarding 
the application of the law to nonlegal domains requires some consideration 
of the expertise from those domains. Likewise, there can be little doubt that 
other disciplines,4 both empirical and conceptual, can off er powerful tools for 
enhancing our understanding of the legal system as well as the law’s impact 
on the social environment.5 Thus my own fi eld of public health law has seen 
the growth of what Scott Burris and colleagues term “legal epidemiology,” 
the empirical study of law’s impact on population health.6 We may all believe 
that seat belt laws save lives, or that laws criminalizing the sexual transmission 
of HIV are ineff ective in reducing the spread of the virus, but only empirical 
research can tell us whether our suppositions have validity.
Nevertheless, although interdisciplinary research is both necessary and 
extraordinarily valuable, its proliferation has posed serious challenges 
to our fi eld. One commonly heard complaint is that the move toward 
interdisciplinarity has produced works that are esoteric, self-indulgent, and 
increasingly divorced from the concerns of the bench and bar.7 A diff erent 
charge is that what passes for interdisciplinary scholarship is often simply 
poor nonlegal scholarship.8 Others argue that the move to interdisciplinarity 
3. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
761, 766-75 (1987); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1219 (“But law, though a discipline, is not and 
never has been an autonomous discipline.”). Judge Posner notes, however, that despite the 
legal realist critique of law’s autonomy, the conception of law as autonomous managed to 
hold sway through the 1950s and 1960s. Posner, supra, at 762-66. 
4. For a discussion of what constitutes a discipline, see Balkin, supra note 1, at 952-57. 
5. Richard A. Posner, The State of Legal Scholarship Today, 97 GEO. L.J. 845, 851-52 (2009).
6. Scott Burris et al., A Transdisciplinary Approach to Public Health Law: The Emerging Practice of Legal 
Epidemiology, 37 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 135, 139-41 (2016).
7. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A 
Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191, 2192 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between 
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).
8. Kathryn Zeiler, The Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Where Might We Go From Here? 66 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 78, 78 (2016) (noting that the “average quality of empirical studies published 
in student-edited law reviews is undoubtedly lower than those published in peer-reviewed 
journals.”). This is not a new charge. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Intellectural Voyeurism in Legal 
Scholarship, 4 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 79, 80 (1992) (charging that much of interdisciplinary 
work is “superfi cial and ill-informed treatment of serious ideas”); Mark A. Graber, Law and 
Sports Offi  ciating: A Misunderstood and Justly Neglected Relationship, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 293, 304 
(1999) (“The probability of error is particularly high when law professors write on non-legal 
subjects.”).
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has increased the fragmentation within legal scholarship, as legal scholars with 
training in diff erent disciplines employ distinct disciplinary methodologies.9 
Together these critiques create, as Jack Balkin stated back in 1996, “a 
profound sense of questioning about the purposes of legal scholarship, 
a profound sense of concern about the fracturing of legal scholarship into 
mutually incomprehensible camps, and a profound sense of worry about the 
increasing and, for many, undesirable isolation of legal scholarship from the 
concerns of the legal profession, the bench, and the bar. From this standpoint, 
interdisciplinary scholarship might seem to be a threat to the self-identity 
of the legal professor and the legal academy, and is consequently embattled 
or under siege.”10 The questions raised by this existential crisis are whether 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship can remain legal scholarship, and hence, 
whether legal scholarship can survive the move to interdisciplinarity. 
To answer those questions, it is useful to identify the two diff erent sides 
of the interdisciplinary divide.11 On one side scholars use the tools (often 
empirical and quantitative) of nonlegal disciplines to study law’s formation, 
the workings of the legal system, and its eff ect on the greater society.12 Much 
of this scholarship is produced by the increasing number of law faculty who 
possess Ph.D.s in other disciplines.13 This scholarship often looks, feels, 
and smells like the scholarship that is produced by our nonlegal colleagues. 
For example, in public health law, there is a plethora of empirical research 
concerning the impact of discrete public health laws on public health.14 
Most of this research relies on epidemiology, econometric modeling, or 
other quantitative methodologies. Lawyers may be valuable or even essential 
members of the teams that conduct such research, but it’s often hard to see 
how this scholarship is legal scholarship, at least as that has traditionally been 
understood,15 as opposed to empirical research about law.
9. Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Character of Legal Theory, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 671, 672 
(2011).
10. Balkin, supra note 1, at 950.
11. Balkin describes several types of interdisciplinary work, two of which are those discussed 
below. Another form he identifi es “would involve treating legal materials as though they 
were the sorts of materials studied in other disciplines.” Id. at 958. For a further discussion of 
an additional approach identifi ed by Balkin, see note 19, infra.
12. Hanoch Dagan and Roy Kreitner refer to this side of the chasm as “intradisciplinarity,” 
which they distinguish from “interdisciplinarity,” which appears in their terminology to be 
a thicker form of the application of the norms and methods of legal scholarship to nonlegal 
disciplines. Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Interdisciplinary Party, 1 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 
23, 25-31 (2014) [hereinafter Dagan & Kreitner, Interdisciplinary]. 
13. Lynn M. LoPucki, Dawn of the Discipline-Based Law Faculty, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 506 (2016) 
(reporting that 21% of tenure-track entry-level hires in American law schools between 2011 
and 2015 had Ph.D. s).
14. Burris et al., supra note 6, at 135, 136.
15. See text accompanying note 16, infra.
103Population-Based Legal Analysis
On the other side of the chasm lies legal scholarship that applies traditional 
methods of legal analysis, which remain primarily doctrinal and normative,16 
to the fi ndings or literature created by another fi eld. This type of scholarship, 
which is quite common in the fi eld of public health law, can be extremely 
valuable. Indeed, once we recognize that law is not wholly autonomous, we 
must concede that the consideration of nonlegal knowledge is essential for 
many scholarly projects. But the interdisciplinarity of such scholarship often 
remains thin. At times this is because the legal scholar lacks suffi  cient expertise 
in the nonlegal materials that are used. But even when the law is applied to 
nonlegal fi elds with an expert’s understanding, the interdisciplinarity is thin 
as long as the legal scholar’s approach to the material remains solely within 
the legal tradition. In such cases, the legal scholar is using the knowledge of 
the nonlegal fi eld much as the litigator uses an expert witness: as the source of 
facts from which legal conclusions can be drawn.
To cross the chasm between nonlegal scholarship about law on the one side 
and traditional legal scholarship about nonlegal matters on the other side, to 
achieve a thick form of interdisciplinarity, or what Scott Burris and colleagues 
term “transdiciplinarity,”17 the scholar must take both the traditions of legal 
scholarship and those of the disciplinary partner seriously. Hanoch Dagan 
and Roy Kreitner explain that this requires reliance “on both a theory (explicit 
or implicit) of the way law’s power and its normativity align, and an account of 
the way in which this discursive cohabitation manifests itself institutionally.”18 
In other words, to be legal scholarship, interdisciplinary scholarship must 
engage with law’s normativity as well as its coerciveness. It must embody the 
norms of law, while providing rationales for its justifi cation and limitations.
Further, as Burris and colleagues suggest, to be interdisciplinary in the 
thick sense of the term, legal scholarship must also assimilate the normativity 
and methodologies of the other discipline.19 Thus, at least in its thick form, 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship is neither the application of the law to 
the other discipline nor the use of the other discipline to study law. It is the 
integration of the other discipline with the law.20
With many nonlegal disciplines, I suspect, this integration may be diffi  cult 
if not impossible to achieve precisely because the other discipline’s normativity 
(to the extent that it exists) lies so far from law’s own normativity as to preclude 
16. See Balkin supra note 1, at 959; Paul Stancil, The Legal Academy as Dinner Party: (A Short) Manifesto 
on the Necessity of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1577. In other words, the 
legal scholar’s modality remains within the legal tradition. 
17. Burris et al., supra note 6, at 141.
18. Dagan & Kreitner, Interdisciplinary, supra note 12, at 25.
19. See Burris et al., supra note 6, at 141.
20. This is close to what Jack Balkin calls the fourth approach to interdisciplinary legal 
scholarship, which involves “merging and marrying the questions and assumptions of 
diff erent disciplines.” Balkin, supra note 1, at 959. He claims that this is the “hardest and 
most unusual” form of interdisciplinarity, “because without a community of disciplinary 
adherents, there really can be no discipline.” Id.
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a smooth assimilation. For example, it is common to fi nd legal scholarship 
that cites to the expertise of chemistry in analyzing issues relating to toxic torts 
or environmental law. One can also imagine scholarship that attempts to apply 
at least some of the disciplinary tools of chemistry (the scientifi c method) to 
law.21 It is hard, however, to conceive of a form of scholarship that blends 
both these methods and the norms of chemistry, such as they are, with those 
of law. In contrast, such a merger has been possible with law and economics 
precisely because the underlying utilitarian and welfarist norms of neoclassical 
economics align closely with signifi cant strands of Anglo-American law.22
Population-based legal analysis, which is based on the integration of law 
with public health, off ers another example, albeit one with very diff erent 
norms, perspectives, and approaches. In contrast to much of public health 
legal scholarship,23 population-based legal analysis does not simply analyze 
the law that relates to public health problems, such as tobacco or infectious 
disease control. Nor is it limited to the use of public health science to study 
the law’s impact on health. Rather, population-based legal analysis situates 
public health’s norms, perspectives, and methodologies within law and uses 
that approach to describe and critique the law,24 as it relates both to matters 
that proximally aff ect public health and those that do not.25 Thus just as 
21. It is challenging, however, to imagine applying specifi c laboratory techniques used by 
chemists to law! Conversely, we have many examples of the application of the tools of 
economics to law.
22. E.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
(1987) (arguing that tort law should be understood as a system for achieving the effi  cient 
allocation of resources); Richard A. Posner, Richard T. Ely Lecture: The Law and Economics 
Movement, 77 AMER. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (explaining that the law and economics movement 
applies the open-ended concepts and assumptions of economics to a wide range of issues 
that need not be limited to markets). A full discussion and critique of the law and economics 
movement, and its various strands, is beyond the scope of this paper.
23. There has been a rich debate as to whether public health law is its own fi eld. For a powerful 
defense of public health law’s status as a legal fi eld, see Micah L. Berman, Defi ning the Field of 
Public Health Law, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 4584, 89 (2013); see also LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN 
& LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (3d ed. 2016). Note 
that both under Berman’s analysis and Gostin and Wiley’s defi nition, public health law itself, 
and not just population-based legal analysis, share the perspectives and normativity of the 
fi eld of public health. A major distinction between public health law and population-based 
legal analysis is that the former is confi ned to a distinct set of issues and questions relating 
to public health, while the latter is not. See text accompanying note 22, supra. In addition, 
population-based legal analysis more explicitly relies on public health methodologies. See 
text accompanying notes 41-42, infra.
24. Lawrence O. Gostin and Lindsay Wiley incorporate public health’s normativity into their 
defi nition of the fi eld of public health law, claiming, “The prime objective of public health 
law is to pursue the highest possible level of physical and mental health in the population, 
consistent with the values of social justice.” GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 23, at 4. Micah 
Berman likewise defi nes public health law in such a way as to incorporate the norms of 
public health. See Berman, supra note 23, at 76-80.
25. Given the breadth of the fi eld of public health, especially when the infl uence of socio-
ecological factors is taken into account, this distinction is only one of degree. Without 
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law and economics locates the norms of neoclassical economics within our 
own legal tradition, and applies the norms, premises, and techniques of 
neoclassical economics to a wide range of legal issues, only some of which are 
overtly economic in nature, population-based legal analysis points to public 
health’s own norms within our legal tradition. Population-based legal analysis 
then applies those norms as well as public health’s perspectives and tools to 
explicate legal issues that may or may not be obviously related to public health. 
What does this mean? Space prevents a full analysis, but three key attributes 
of population-based legal analysis warrant brief discussion. These relate to its 
normativity, its perspective, and its methodology. 
In 1988 the Institute of Medicine defi ned public health as “what we, as a 
society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy.”26 
Although this statement was meant to be descriptive, like other defi nitions 
of public health,27 it is implicitly normative, as it presumes that the health of 
populations is not simply a condition that can be measured, but a good that 
society should actively seek. Population-based legal analysis shares this norm 
but locates it not only in the discipline of public health but also within the 
law. Or, to put it another way, population-based legal analysis recognizes the 
protection of population health as a goal or value that is embedded within the 
legal system.28
This population health norm lies deep within the common law, as exemplifi ed 
by the maxims of salus populi suprema lex and, less obviously, sic utere, as well as 
in tort law’s emphasis on injury prevention.29 The norm is also deeply rooted 
in the constitutional concept of the police power and formative conceptions 
of federalism and due process. Even more fundamentally, the protection of 
population health may be viewed as one of the motivating justifi cations for a 
legal system.30 In eff ect, we have laws in part to ensure our collective health 
question, population-based legal analysis draws heavily upon and has been applied most 
readily in conjunction with public health law. Indeed, Berman argues that the insights of 
population-based legal analysis is one of defi ning characteristics of the fi eld of public health 
law. Berman, supra note 23, at 80.
26. INST. OF MED., COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, THE FUTURE OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988).
27. See PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 7-13 (discussing diff erent defi nitions of public 
health).
28. Wendy E. Parmet, Health: Policy or Law? A Population-Based Analysis of the Supreme Court’s ACA Cases, 
J. HEALTH POL’Y, POLITICS & L. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Parmet, Health: Policy or 
Law?].
29. Without question many tort scholars argue that tort law should and does emphasize norms 
of corrective justice over injury prevention. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in 
Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). My claim here is not that injury prevention is the 
primary goal of tort law, but simply that concerns for injury prevention are also apparent in 
tort cases and tort scholarship. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Weeks, Beyond Compensation: Using Torts to 
Promote Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 27, 29-32, 39-58. (2007).
30.  GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 23, at 122-25; PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 35-42.
106 Journal of Legal Education
and well-being, goods that we value and that we cannot achieve alone in a state 
of nature.31 Thus public health’s normativity aligns with law’s normativity. As 
a result, the merger of public health and law is inevitably tighter and more 
susceptible to a thick form of interdisciplinarity than is the application of 
many other nonlegal fi elds to law.
Importantly, contra salus populi suprema lex, my claim that population health is 
a legal norm does not imply that population health ought to take precedence 
over other legal norms, never mind binding legal rules. Nor does population-
based legal analysis assert that the norm is one that is always followed. Indeed, 
I have argued elsewhere that the public health norm has faced signifi cant 
erosion in recent decades.32 What is critical, however, is the assertion that the 
legal system and public health have a shared normativity, which guides the 
determination of the proper scope of law’s coerciveness.
A second, related attribute of population-based legal analysis is its adoption 
of public health’s own population perspective. Critically, this adoption is 
compelled by the population health norm. In other words, if law’s normativity 
holds that coercion is justifi ed and bounded in part by the goal of protecting 
the health of populations, law must adopt a perspective that enables it to see 
populations qua populations. That’s where the population perspective comes 
in.
In brief, the population perspective prioritizes populations as opposed to 
individuals, noting that individuals are situated within (multiple, overlapping, 
and contingent) populations.33 In so doing, the population perspective is 
heavily infl uenced by public health’s subfi eld of epidemiology, including 
especially social epidemiology, which studies the infl uence of social factors 
on the prevalence of disease within populations. Hence the population 
perspective recognizes that the choices individuals make, and the risks they 
face, are signifi cantly determined by broader, so-called population-level 
factors, including the social, physical, and legal environment, often coined the 
social determinants of health.34 
To understand this perspective, consider the lead crisis in Flint, Michigan.35 
An individual perspective, such as that held by a typical clinician, and often 
31. This claim relies on the proposition that public health is at least in part a public good. See 
GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 23, at 8-9; Patricia Illingworth & Wendy E. Parmet, Solidarity and 
Health: A Public Goods Justifi cation, 43 DIAMETROS 65, 66 (2015), http://www.diametros.iphils.
uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/download/715/769.
32. See Parmet, Health: Policy or Law?, supra note 28.
33. It is worth emphasizing that the population perspective does not presume that there is a 
single population, “the public,” but rather that there are multiple, ever-changing populations 
that face diff erent circumstances and upon which the law may have diff erent impacts. See 
PARMET, POPULATIONS supra note 2, at 5-22.
34. World Health Organization, Social Determinants of Health, http://www.who.int/social_determinants/
en/.
35. See FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (2016), https://www.michigan.
gov/documents/snyder/FWATF_FINAL_REPORT_21March2016_517805_7.pdf; Sara 
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by courts, might ask why any individual child in Flint has elevated lead levels. 
This might reveal that the child was exposed to lead in her home, or that 
the child was genetically more susceptible to lead than other children. This 
individualistic perspective might lead a clinician36 or court37 to conclude that 
the child’s elevated lead level was caused by some choice of the child or the 
parent, perhaps to live in a home with lead paint, or to use unfi ltered tap water. 
Alternatively, the individualistic perspective may attribute responsibility to 
another individual or set of individuals whose unlawful action may be found 
to have caused the child’s exposure.
The population perspective, in contrast, compares rates of disease across 
populations.38 If one contrasts the incidence of lead poisoning in children in 
Flint with that of children in other communities, it becomes apparent that 
something was going on at a population level, leading to a higher-than-typical 
rate of lead poisoning for children in Flint. We can then begin to see that the 
high levels of exposure found in any one individual was determined less by the 
individual’s genes or behaviors than by her membership in a population that 
was exposed to lead-tainted water. This may have resulted from the actions of 
discrete individuals, but also from a wider array of social determinants, a point 
that only becomes evident when we compare rates across multiple populations. 
Hence notions of causation, responsibility, and risk look very diff erent from a 
population perspective than from an individualistic lens.
The application of the public health norm when combined with a 
population perspective leads public health practitioners and advocates to seek 
interventions, including laws, that operate across one or more populations. 
As epidemiologist Geoff rey Rose explains, “This is the attempt to control the 
determinants of incidence, to lower the mean level of risk factors, to shift the 
Ganim & Linh Tran, How Tap Water became Toxic in Flint, Michigan, CNN (Jan. 13, 2016), http://
www.cnn.com/2016/01/11/health/toxic-tap-water-fl int-michigan/.
36. Interestingly, in Flint it was a clinician who decided to go beyond individual cases and look 
at blood levels more broadly who helped to expose the problem. See Sanjay Gupta, Ben 
Tinker & Tim Hume, ‘Our Mouths were Ajar’: Doctor’s Fight to Expose Flint’s Water Crisis, CNN (Jan. 
22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/health/fl int-water-mona-hanna-attish/.
37. This is not to say that plaintiff s cannot succeed in holding defendants responsible for 
actions that operate on a population level. In the case of Flint, several lawsuits, including 
class action lawsuits, have been fi led. See Ray Sanchez, Flint Water Crisis Lawsuits: 5 Things to 
Know, CNN, (Mar. 11, 2016), www.cnn.com/2016/03/11/us/fl int-crisis-lawsuits-fi ve-things/. 
Nevertheless, these lawsuits face a range of hurdles, including jurisdictional and immunity 
defenses that upon closer inspection may refl ect the individualistic perspective that 
permeates much of contemporary jurisprudence. For a fuller discussion of how the failure 
to appreciate populations aff ects issues of jurisdiction, immunity, and tort liability, see 
PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 65-68, 219-43; Wendy E. Parmet, Valuing the Unidentifi ed: 
The Potential of Public Health Law, 53 JURIMETRICS 255, 274-76 (2013).
38. Geoffrey Rose, Sick Individuals and Sick Populations, 30 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 427, 428-29 
(2001).
108 Journal of Legal Education
whole distribution of exposure in a favourable direction.”39 Such interventions 
are often said to be “upstream,” as they seek at a broad population level to 
reduce or prevent health risks rather than respond to illnesses that occur in 
discrete, identifi ed individuals. Thus the population perspective emphasizes 
prevention rather than treatment or compensation. And in law, it shifts the 
emphasis from individual choice to social context.
Space precludes a full discussion of how the population perspective aligns 
with and diff ers from the more individualistic perspective that is predominant 
in contemporary American jurisprudence.40 Suffi  ce it to say that although traces 
of the population perspective can be found in our legal corpus (the leading 
public health law case Jacobson v. Massachusetts comes most readily to mind),41 its 
incorporation into legal analysis sheds important light on myriad doctrines, 
including causation in tort law, justiciability,42 and criminal responsibility.  
Nevertheless, because the norms that inform population-based analysis are 
already embedded in our legal system, and the questions asked are similar 
to those traditionally asked by legal scholars (the legitimate scope of law’s 
coerciveness), the scholarship that results from the injection of the population 
perspective into legal analysis remains easily identifi able as legal scholarship.
The third defi ning attribute of population-based legal analysis, and 
one closely connected to public health’s population perspective, is the 
incorporation of public health’s methodologies into legal reasoning. In its 
thinnest sense, this means as the legal realists would have it, that the empirical 
fi ndings of public health science, especially epidemiology, should matter 
in a genuine way to our understanding and critiques of law. After all, if the 
preservation of population health is one of law’s goals, the empirical question 
of how law aff ects health should matter.43 Often today it does not, as both 
scholars and, more disturbingly, courts throw around claims that particular 
laws will help or harm public health with little heed to the scientifi c basis, 
indeed even the plausibility, of their claims.44 Yet population-based legal 
39. Id. at 431. This is not to say that public health practice has relied exclusively on population-
level interventions. To the contrary, the fi eld has often employed far more individualistic 
approaches, including some that have (problematically from a population perspective) 
blamed individuals for their own health conditions. See Wendy E. Parmet, Dangerous 
Perspectives the Perils of Individualizing Public Health Problems, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 83 (2009).
40. For a fuller discussion, see PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 5-22.
41. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
42. See PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at passim. 
43. This is not to say that it should be dispositive in any particular case. Population-based legal 
analysis does not claim that population health is law’s only goal, or that otherwise binding 
legal rules should be not trump population health outcomes.
44. This tendency to issue unfounded assumptions about a law’s impact on public health 
seems especially apparent in some recent First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Thompson 
v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (rejecting the government’s contention that 
a ban on advertising by compounding pharmacies was necessary to prevent large-scale 
compounding); K. Outterson, Regulating Compounding Pharmacies After NECC, 367 NEW ENGL. J. 
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analysis demands more than the good faith use of public health science. In 
its most robust sense, the incorporation of public health methodologies in 
law opens the way for the adoption of a probabilistic and inductive mode of 
analysis that recognizes that “both risks and benefi ts are generally matters of 
degree [and] the law must accept that few things in life are either absolute 
or defi nite.”45 Thus there is reduced reliance on deductive reasoning and a 
greater appreciation that if law is to achieve its population health goals it must 
recognize the complex, contingent continuum of risks, care about empirical 
facts, and abandon its reliance on a formalism that is oblivious to the population 
impacts of its decisions. In short, population-based legal analysis off ers a form 
of interdisciplinarity that integrates law with public health, merging public 
health’s normative, ontological, and methodological aspects into traditional 
doctrinal analysis. In this sense it is not simply the application of law to public 
health; nor is it the use of public health science to study law. It is the union 
of law and public health around issues that relate to public health and, even 
more broadly, to any and all legal issues that aff ect the health or well-being of 
populations. In other words, to all of law’s domain. 

That population-based legal analysis off ers a bridge across the chasm of 
interdisciplinarity does not mean, however, that the approach lack challenges. 
Space prevents a full discussion, but let me mention two that are especially 
daunting.
The fi rst relates to what I have called a population health norm. As was 
noted above, population-based legal analysis does not presume that health is 
the only or highest objective of the legal system, only that it is a legal norm with 
deep legal roots. Still, for the norm to have any content, we need to know what 
we mean by population health, and that itself may elude us. Without diving 
deeply here into that question, let me simply note that the claim that public 
health is a legal norm demands that we do not limit our understanding of 
human health to very narrow biomedical conceptions. If health is understood 
solely as the absence of biological pathologies, the reach of the public health 
norm might not extend broadly across legal issues.46 Yet, if we adopt a very 
broad defi nition of health, such as the that off ered by the World Health 
Organization, which defi nes health as the “state of complete physical, mental, 
MED. 1969 (2012) (suggesting that the New England Compounding Pharmacy fi asco which 
led to the deaths of 64 people might not have happened if the Court had not struck down 
FDA regulations in Thompson).
45. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 59.
46. Sridhar Venkatpuram raises a somewhat similar point in discussing the normative 
implications of diff erent defi nitions of health. SRIDHAR VENKATPURAM, HEALTH JUSTICE: AN 
ARGUMENT FROM THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 41-72 (2011). On the other hand, even a narrow 
defi nition of health can support a broad population health norm if we accept that biological 
health is in large measure socially determined. See PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 8.
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and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infi rmity,”47 we 
risk confl ating health with well-being and population health with the common 
good. In that case, the unique contributions of the discipline of public health 
to population-based legal analysis may fade. As John Coggon astutely argued 
in his book What Makes Health Public?, public health’s normativity can easily 
elide into a theory of the state.48 Sometimes I think that’s the point of the 
analysis, but that raises challenges for the claim that population-based legal 
analysis is the integration of law and public health, as opposed to but a version 
of liberal theory by another name.49
Yet if, on the one hand, population-based legal analysis risks losing its own 
interdisciplinary identity by collapsing into political theory, it also risks, on the 
other hand, remaining too specialized to gain traction beyond the public health 
law community. Although I have shown how population-based legal analysis 
can be and is broader in its scope than public health law, the approach remains 
closely identifi ed with public health law which, despite its recent renaissance,50 
is still a small and relatively marginalized fi eld of legal scholarship.
This is too bad. Although it goes too far to suggest that public health 
law is the most important fi eld of law, public health law interrogates some 
of the most critical questions regarding the relationships among law, human 
society, and our own mortality. It also helps us to recognize our profound and 
inevitable interdependency. Our health depends more on factors that aff ect 
the populations we comprise than on the choices we make. Likewise, although 
public health science is not the only nonlegal discipline suitable for integration 
with the law, its merger with law off ers new perspectives on core legal issues, 
unearthing ancient yet still relevant chords in our jurisprudence. But even for 
those uninterested in public health, the merger off ers insight into how we can 
bridge the interdisciplinary divide.
47. Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185, 
http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf. 
48. JOHN COGGON, WHAT MAKES HEALTH PUBLIC? A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF MORAL, LEGAL, 
AND POLITICAL CLAIMS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 146-48 (2012).
49. Id. As Coggon suggests, if the normativity of public health collapses into a more general 
theory of the state, public health itself provides no unique normative content. In that sense, 
the population perspective can be viewed as simply one response to the question “why have 
law,” instead of the merger of law and public health. 
50. Berman, supra note 23, at 46-47. 
